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In t ro duct ion  
The first quarter of the twentieth century was a time of rapid change in 
British politics. Before the First World War the Liberals were the dominant 
force at Westminster, following their historic landslide victory in 1906 over 
the Conservatives and their Liberal Unionist allies. By 1924, however, a 
new order had been created, with Labour and the Conservatives competing 
for a now declining Liberal vote in order to become the principal party of 
government. Less obvious were the changes taking place in „Celtic‟ Britain. 
By the outbreak of the First World War the stimulus of the „Irish question‟ 
had led to a renewed interest in Scottish and Welsh concerns over issues 
like devolution and Anglican disestablishment. Growing disenchantment 
with Westminster was to culminate in the formation of Plaid Cymru 
and the National Party of Scotland in the 1920s. Te implications for the 
future were significant since nationalist movements operating outside of the 
London-based parties had finally been established during a crucial period of 
realignment for Britain as a whole. 
There has been a tendency in Cornish Studies to emphasise the contrasting 
theme of continuity west of the Tamar. In the first place, economic and 
social stagnation enabled the Cornish Liberals to survive the early 1920s, a 
period which Chris Cook termed the Age of Alignment, leaving the 
old-style radicals firmly secure as the principal alternative to the 
Conservatives with Labour unable to win even a single seat until 1945.
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This produced a distinctive pattern of party politics in Cornwall that essentially 
endures to 
 
the present day. One might add that in terms of nationalist politics it was 
not until the launch of Mebyon Kernow (Sons of Cornwall) in 1951 that a 
Cornish political movement even existed. Scholars have focused on the non-
political stance of early Revivalists like Henry Jenner and the continuing 
appeal of antiquarianism for organisations like Cowethas Kelto -Kernuak 
(Celtic Cornish Society) in 1901 and the Old Cornwall movement. 
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Yet by 
the late 1990s there were indications that both interpretations were starting to 
be modified in the light of new research. In the immediate aftermath of the 
First World War, Cornwall was briefly at the forefront in the rise of Labour, 
with the party‟s share of the vote in 1918 comparing favourably with other 
regions destined to become Labour strongholds .
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Similarly, there has been 
some consideration of the political dimension to Cornish identity ranging 
from Jenner‟s right-wing sympathies to the impact of the Celtic Revival on 
party politics .
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Nonetheless, it is surprising that there has been no major 
study of this critical period in Cornish political history. In particular there is 
a clear need for an approach that can usefully draw together both avenues of 
inquiry by placing Cornwall within a wider British context. 
This article seeks to initiate further debate through a case study of the 
early political career of Francis Acland. In December 1910 he was selected to 
fight the radical stronghold of Camborne and his subsequent twelve years as a 
Cornish MP coincide with the process of transition taking place in British 
politics, since by 1922 Labour had already emerged as the national opposition to 
the Conservatives. After outlining Acland‟s neglected achievements at 
Westminster, the article moves to a thematic consideration with his personal 
experiences analysed in relation to Labour‟s challenge to Liberalism in a 
regional framework. His strategy for dealing with this situation, notably 
through the advocacy of a more meaningful post-war relationship between 
the Liberal and Labour parties, offers further insight into the history of 
progressive politics at this time. Biographical studies of individual politicians 
can also highlight the political dynamics of the provinces. In the case of 
Acland, the article will focus on the challenge of the Labour movement, the 
early rise of anti-metropolitanism, and his personal perspectives on Cornwall 
and the Cornish. 
The fo rgot ten  L ibera l :  loca t ing  Ac land in  re la t ion  to  Br i t i sh  
and Cornish politics 
An article based on a study of Francis Acland (1874–1939) might seem 
surprising given his virtual invisibility in historical studies of the twentieth 
century. Although a junior government minister at the War Office and the 
Foreign Office during the years leading up to the First World War, there 
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are few references to his activities at these key government departments. In 
1998 he was not even included in the standard Dictionary of Liberal Biography. 
Although this volume covered the biographies of over 200 individuals 
associated with British Liberalism, since Acland had not been a party leader, 
served as a cabinet minister or been recognised as a leading intellectual 
thinker, he simply did not meet the relevant criteria. In contrast there was a 
biographical note dedicated to Sir Richard Acland, his more famous son, 
who had resigned from the party in 1942 after a brief career as MP for the 
Devon seat of Barnstaple to establish the Common Wealth movement .5 
There has been a similar lack of interest in regard to his place in Cornwall‟s 
political history. Philip Payton rightly notes that the „towering figure of 
Cornish Liberalism in this period was Isaac Foot‟. 6 Indeed, the ability of Foot to 
personify the regional interests of Cornwall established a model that was to 
be embraced later in the century by popular and charismatic politicians 
from Harold Hayman for Labour to David Penhaligon for the Liberals. 
Significantly, all three politicians are still fondly remembered in oral history 
recordings relating to Cornwall. By contrast, Acland found it difficult to 
develop a similar appeal that could enable his parliamentary career to pass 
into cultural memory.
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 Even at the time there were individuals who dismissed 
him as merely „an academic politician‟ from the aristocratic elite who could 
not truly understand the daily struggle of his constituents.8 
But the evidence suggests that Acland‟s contribution deserves greater 
recognition. He was the heir to a baronetcy and the extensive Killerton estates 
across the South West of Britain, including 5,000 acres in Cornwall alone .9 
The Aclands were accustomed to playing a prominent role in provincial 
affairs, with Francis boasting in his election address in December 1910 
that in „each of the last three centuries members of my fami ly have had 
the honour of representing Cornish seats in the House of Commons. It 
will be my constant endeavour that in this century also I may be found no 
less worthy than they of the trust and friendship of Cornishmen‟. 10 During 
the final years of Herbert Asquith‟s government he seemed destined to „go 
far in the counsels of the nation‟. 11 After serving at the Foreign Office he 
was appointed as Financial Secretary to the Treasury in 1915 and became a 
member of the Privy Council a year later. Acland also played a key role in 
the pre-war campaign for women‟s suffrage, with Jo Vellacott portraying 
him as the most sympathetic member of Asquith‟s government.12 Following 
the disastrous performance of the Liberals in 1918, Acland briefly emerged 
as a potential leader of the parliamentary party and a leading advocate of a 
rejuvenated Liberal-Labour alliance. In the mid-1920s his defection to the 
David Lloyd George camp resulted in a new role in the party‟s ongoing 
policy review. He became a key member of the former wartime leader‟s 
inner council alongside more famous individuals like John Maynard Keynes 
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who was responsible for producing the party‟s radical programme to reduce 
unemployment entitled Britain‟s Industrial Future, the so-called Yellow Book, in 
1928. Acland‟s reputation as a progressive landowner meant that in his case he 
became the leading figure associated with the party‟s parallel land reform 
programme, the Green Book .
13 
But his subsequent reputation was undermined 
by his failure to return to the House of Commons – for a lengthy period of 
eight years – following his defeat in 1924 at Tiverton. When Acland finally 
managed to win a seat following his narrow victory at the North Cornwall 
by-election in 1932, the Liberal Women‟s New was lavish in its praise for his 
parliamentary abilities: 
From every aspect – character, intelligence, experience, tradition – Sir 
Francis is eminently a parliamentarian; his place should always be 
among those who help to govern, but owing to the workings of our 
electoral system and the party‟s ill luck at [elections] Westminster has 
missed his front-bench mind for many years.14 
However, Acland had returned to parliament at a time when the Liberals 
were once more moving into the political wilderness. In the previous year the other 
Liberal MPs for Cornwall had been able to strengthen their political reputations 
by receiving ministerial posts in the National government. Both Walter 
Runciman at St Ives and Sir Donald Maclean in North Cornwall became 
members of the cabinet, while Isaac Foot was appointed as the Minister 
for Mines. In 1933, however, the independent Liberals withdrew their 
support from the government, and Acland remained out of office for 
the remaining period up until his death in 1939. Paradoxically, while 
Acland‟s absence from parliament came at a critical time in regard to 
his own political career, it should be acknowledged that he represented 
constituencies in Cornwall for a longer period than any other Liberal in 
the twentieth century. His record of nineteen years as MP for Camborne 
and North Cornwall compares favourably to more well-known individuals 
like Tomas Agar Robartes (1906, 1908–15), Isaac Foot (1922–24, 1929–35), 
John Pardoe (1966–79). Paul Tyler (1974, 1992–2005) and David Penhaligon 
(1974–86).15 Moreover, his parliamentary victories assisted the survival of 
Cornish Liberalism at critical times in the party‟s history. In both 1918 and 
1935 he was the only Liberal to be returned for Cornwall and without his 
success, albeit by narrow majorities, the regional party might well have lost 
all credibility. A Labour victory in the earlier election could easily have 
been the catalyst that the socialists required in order to sustain their initial 
breakthrough. Similarly, success at North Cornwall in the 1930s helped to 
sustain Liberal traditions during the difficult middle decades of the century 
when the party appeared to be in a state of permanent decline. 
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Acland also provides an interesting example of a politician trying to define 
his position in connection to the conflicting worlds of high and low politics. 
In retrospect, he was one of the last rising stars in the Liberal Party who could 
still aspire to high office. Te Cornish Post described him in 1917 as „an able 
and conscious specimen of the cultured and trained‟ class of parliamentary 
officials and administrators that had traditionally dominated British politics.16 
By the early 1930s, however, a new generation of Liberals were calling on the 
party to adjust to the fact that it was no longer able to meet its traditional 
goal of forming the next government.
17
 This was particularly the case in 
Cornwall where the party was to reposition itself after the Second World 
War as the anti-metropolitan alternative to the other parties. By studying a 
particular individual we can obtain further insight into the early stages of 
political change. Te next section will analyse the impact of political change in 
Cornwall through reference to Acland‟s own experiences. 
Cornwa l l  i n  t r ans i t ion?  
Historians have been divided for many years in their search for a convincing 
explanation for the rise of Labour and the decline of the Liberals. Te view 
that the social foundations of Liberalism were being undermined by the 
emergence of Labour even before 1914 has proved very popular. Advocates 
of this approach, such as Keith Laybourn and Michael Childs, argue that 
the demise of the old order was only to be expected given the rise of class 
politics, particularly amongst the younger generation.
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 But other historians 
have challenged this interpretation. Trevor Wilson claimed that it was the 
political and social consequences of the First World War that were really 
responsible, and Duncan Tanner subsequently developed this perspective 
when he stressed the significance of the wartime collapse of the Progressive 
Alliance between Labour and the Liberals. 19 
Te complex nature of realignment has been essential in maintaining a 
sense of debate over the reasons for Labour‟s breakthrough. Yet by the late 
1990s scholars were starting to claim that this was also the very reason why 
the discussion should move to a balanced consideration of the subject. A 
good example was Andrew Torpe, who concluded that rival interpretations 
of the potential of the pre-war Labour Party were often too simplistic 
considering that there was no „clear pattern to the movement of events ‟.20 
Similarly, David Dutton argues the case for a „multi-dimensional‟ approach 
based on a careful and sensitive consideration of the subject that covers both 
high and low politics. As he puts it, „whatever the precise truth, it seems 
improbable that any monocausal explanation will suffice‟. Despite the sense 
of inevitability that was associated with Labour‟s breakthrough, there is a 
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need to „accord more importance to the clashes of personality, the accidents 
of history and ... the individuality of the voter ‟.21 Such a view highlights the 
need to explore realignment from a multiple voices perspective by analysing 
the careers of individual politicians, recognising the existence of regional 
variations and exploring counterfactual possibilities. 
All three avenues of inquiry can be applied to a case study of Acland‟s 
early years in Cornwall. In the first place, his personal story of realignment 
needs to be located within the micro political environment of Camborne 
politics. Local studies of the rise of Labour tend to concentrate on those 
industrial and urban areas of Britain where the party was able to make an 
early and sustained breakthrough .
22 
Although Camborne was essentially an 
industrial constituency, there was little evidence of a direct parliamentary 
threat from Labour before the war. Working-class voters in the area 
still identified with Liberalism rather than Labour and in 1906 a Social 
Democratic Federation candidate had polled a derisory 1.5 per cent of the 
vote. Election issues in December 1910 simply echoed the  debates of the 
previous century. Despite references to social reform in Acland‟s election 
address, his supporters concentrated on religious concerns like temperance 
and Welsh disestablishment.
23
 Te issue of Irish Home Rule was particularly 
controversial because of the anti-Catholic sentiments associated with Cornish 
Methodism. Following the Liberal split of 1886 it was the breakaway Liberal 
Unionists that emerged as the dominant political force in Cornwall and 
they had survived as the largest political force until 1900. In December 1910 
the Unionist candidate for Camborne attempted to shift the focus of the 
campaign away from House of Lords reform to Irish Home Rule. He argued 
that „it would be an everlasting disgrace to the Nonconformists here if they 
put in a man who voted in favour of ... putting the Nonconformists in the 
North of Ireland under the heels of a majority ruled by the Catholic priests‟ . 24 
Acland was forced to recognise that many voters had been „thoroughly worked up 
by religious bigotry against Home Rule‟ for Ireland .25 Nonetheless, the 
critical factor was that at the local level the Liberal versus Unionist cleavage 
was still firmly established. 
By 1918 there had been a dramatic change in the nature of party politics in 
Camborne. Labour was able to mount a credible challenge to Acland with George 
Nicholls, the party‟s candidate, coming remarkably close to success with 48 
per cent of the vote in a straight fight. Acland admitted to Asquith that „my 
return was rather a fluke for though I beat a good Labour man in a straight 
fight, I should not have won if the Tory candidate, ... had been put forward 
‟.26 Te regional weakness of Labour before the war makes its early 
breakthrough appear even more surprising. One possibility is that the 
tensions generated as a result of the 1913 China Clay strike in mid-Cornwall 
had a radicalising effect on the Labour movement throughout the region. 
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Te eventual defeat of the strikers following their bitter campaign for union 
recognition and a minimum wage of 25 shillings a week is still remembered 
today. But a recent study by Ronald Perry and Charles Turlow casts doubt 
on the long-term importance of the strike. In their view the reality of the 
conflict was that the clay strikers were isolated from the wider community 
with „half the workforce ... reluctant to join in‟. More significant for the local 
Labour movement after the First World War was the impact  of wider trends in 
British industrial relations. Perry and Turlow conclude that it was only to 
be expected that Cornwall would be influenced by a rapid expansion in 
trade union membership throughout the United Kingdom that „shifted the 
balance to workers‟ at the expense of the employers. „Even without the 1913 
strike, and the powerful intervention of the Workers‟ Union, labour strength in 
the clay industry would probably have grown ‟.27 
This interpretation underestimates the scale of the Labour advance in 
Cornwall. It was mentioned earlier that in regard to party politics the region 
was actually leading, not copying, the rise of the British Labour movement 
by the end of the First World War. Underlying these developments on the 
electoral front was a growing confidence on the part of the trade unions 
in industrial areas like the Clay Country and the mining districts further 
west.
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 Whatever the actual realities of the dispute, it perhaps took on added 
significance because of the absence of a trade union tradition in Cornwall. 
With the decline of the mining industry the Clay Country was „left as the 
isolated rump of extractive production in an otherwise de -industrialising 
economy‟.29 In these circumstances the 1913 strike provided a rare symbolic 
event that could define and articulate the values of the Cornish Labour 
movement. Although no Labour candidate actually stood in 1918, partly 
because the abolition of the old St Austell division meant that the Clay 
Country became part of the much larger seat of Penryn & Falmo uth, it 
became the only major area in Cornwall in which the party made steady 
progress throughout the inter-war period. Although further research is 
required in order to conclude if there was a specific relationship between the 
strike and these subsequent developments, letters written to Acland in 1913 
indicate that the strike did have a profound impact on the political culture of 
the time. J. F. Williams, a solicitor from Gorran Haven, remarked on 2 
September that police tactics were making the strikers feel „outcasts, with all 
society fighting against them‟: 
I went round most of the clay district this afternoon in a motor. 
There were policemen everywhere. Te whole place had a Russian 
appearance. Groups of men were on the peaks of the St Austell Alps 
like the chamois in Cook‟s pictures of Switzerland. Te district is quiet – 
terrorised into quiet. But the whole countryside is full of rumours; 
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this morning in our little fishing village – and we have no connection 
with the strikers – over 11 miles away – there was a rumour that a man 
and a little girl had been killed by the Welsh strike-breakers – and 
things were said not pleasant for a Liberal to hear .30 
Acland‟s private correspondence also gives particular prominence to the 
impact of the Asquith-Lloyd George split of December 1916. Just at the 
very moment when a more confident Labour movement was emerging in 
Cornwall, the Liberals were distracted by events at Westminster. A few 
months after the formation of Lloyd George‟s wartime coalition Acland was 
already warning of the rise of socialism and the demise of his own party. In 
May 1917 he remarked that Camborne was „going Labour as fast as it can‟ 
and a month later expressed doubts that there was even „going to be a Tory 
and Liberal party anymore‟ .a
31 
With Lloyd George, the former champion of 
radical Liberalism, now in alliance with the Conservatives, such views were 
to be expected. Moreover, Acland was frustrated by the failure of Asquith to 
mount a real challenge to the government. Writing towards the end of 1917 
he claimed that the former Prime Minister was „too much of a gentleman to 
hit hard‟. Te party was also failing to develop a post-war reconstruction 
programme and he was critical of the „ex-Cabinet ministers [who] might have 
done more than they have done in working out policies on social questions‟. 
Acland concluded that „I really think the Liberal party is dead & that one 
will simply have to think of men & policies after the war – not of parties‟.32 
Such comments tend to support the view that it was internal divisions that 
created a negative mindset amongst radical Liberals. This sense of a party in a 
state of imminent demise is evident in the following letter written to Acland in 
August 1918 by C. A. Millman, the Liberal agent for Bodmin: 
No one can deny that our position as a party is being gradually 
undermined and our power for usefulness destroyed. We look for a 
lead in the House of Commons and in the country but we look in 
vain. Meanwhile the Tories, accustomed to underhand methods, and 
the Labour party with a courage and purpose I admire and should 
much like to emulate, are preparing for the struggle which cannot 
long be delayed. We are daily losing supporters because we refuse to 
formulate a well-conceived programme. Never in our political history 
has a great political party been content to allow judgement to go 
against it by default.33 
Within a year such views were to lead Millman to defect to Labour. 
His personal transition from radicalism to socialism was symbolic of similar 
decisions being taken by many other erstwhile Liberals. Yet it also suggests 
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that the rise of Labour was far from an inevitable process. What was crucial 
was the existence of an independent Labour party at this time that could 
offer an alternative home for those radicals who were disillusioned by the 
actions of Lloyd George and the inactivity of Asquith. In May 1919 Charles 
Trevelyan, a former junior minister in Asquith‟s government, remarked to 
Eleanor, the wife of Francis, that parties were „only methods of combining 
for political purposes‟. He justified his defection to Labour on the grounds 
that it offered an alternative vehicle for progressive politics. Since the Liberals 
had now lost their reputation for moral and intellectual leadership, it was time 
for Radicals to look elsewhere. He added that he did not „expect much from 
the Labour party except that it will manage to evolve the organisation which 
will pretty soon get hold of the government, probably to make a horrid mess of 
it‟. What was important was that it offered „a new conscience and policy‟ that 
contrasted markedly with the timidity of the Asquithian leadership.34 In that 
sense his views echoed Acland‟s belief that the post-war order would be based 
on „men & policies‟ rather than parties. 
With hindsight it can be said that realignment actually resulted in 
rigid electoral polarization based on powerful party machines, rather than 
loose and competing programmes reflecting principles and ideas. Yet a 
consideration of developments in Cornwall indicates that we should avoid 
assumptions of inevitability in relation to the process of rea lignment. For 
example, it was mentioned earlier that the career of Isaac Foot, the founder 
of a political dynasty that was to include a future leader of the Labour Party, is 
synonymous with the survival of Cornish Liberalism. In early 1918 this 
seemed a remote possibility since Foot wanted to retire prematurely from 
active politics in order to devote more time to a young family and growing 
business commitments. A plan was arranged for Acland to withdraw from 
Camborne in order to contest Bodmin, and it was only shortly before the 
1918 election, probably due to Acland‟s decision that the honourable course of 
action was to defend his own seat, that Foot agreed to fight Bodmin.
35
 It is 
worth speculating on the long-term implications. Te Foot tradition was to become 
central to the cultural memory of Cornish Liberalism following his by-election 
victory at Bodmin in 1922. This symbolic event, which sustained the party‟s 
traditions at the very moment when the Liberals were under threat at the 
micro level, was vital in paving the way for subsequent regional victories in 
1923 and 1929.
36
 One might add that the strength of Cornish Liberalism 
down to the present day can be traced back to the inspirational stimulus of 
the Foot era. Yet in reality this particular course of events was far from 
inevitable in the closing months of the war. 
Just as likely at the time, perhaps, was Acland‟s own vision of a new 
progressive force. He believed that an opportunity now existed for „an 
entirely new division of parties‟ that could bring about a revival in progressive 
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politics based on an equal partnership between Labour and the independent 
Liberals .37 Rather than the demise of organized Liberalism he envisaged a 
natural extension of the pre-war Lib-Lab pact, which had been responsible 
for the early expansion of Labour as a parliamentary force. Cornwall was to 
be in the forefront of collaboration with Acland‟s move to Bodmin paving the way 
for a regional pact in which Labour would be offered the opportunity for a 
straight fight against the Conservatives in Camborne and possibly 
another Cornish seat. In return the Liberals would be able to make their 
„position absolutely safe and sure with regard to the remaining three seats ‟.38 Te 
proposal demonstrated the decline of morale amongst the Liberals since their 
historic victory in all seven Cornish constituencies in 1906. It also led to a 
serious bid by Acland to transform the cause of progressive politics 
throughout Britain. Following Asquith‟s defeat in 1918 he was to present 
himself as the „Radical‟ contender for the chairmanship of the parliamentary 
party with the aim of forming a close alliance with Labour. It could be 
argued that the failure of his challenge had serious implications for the 
subsequent development of British politics as a whole. Yet the significance 
for Cornwall is that it challenges assumptions that the survival of Liberalism 
was inevitable just in the same way that it has been suggested that change 
was guaranteed elsewhere. In reality the period immediately before and after 
the end of the First World War was characterised by fluidity rather than 
political continuity. 
T h e  C o r n i s h  Q u e s t i o n  
Te subject of political realignment should not be restricted to the established 
debate surrounding the rise of Labour. By the 1920s there were indications 
that British politics was moving in a variety of directions, ranging from a 
strengthening of the rural-urban divide to the emergence of territorial parties 
in the „Celtic fringe‟. Taking rural politics momentarily as an example, it 
could be argued that the ability of the Liberals to make significant gains 
from the Conservatives in agricultural constituencies in  the early 1920s 
demonstrated that the potential for realignment went further than just the 
core process of Labour replacing the Liberals. By establishing a secure bloc of 
rural seats, some Liberal strategists concluded that their party would then be in 
a credible position to present itself as the real alternative to Labour .
39 
Even in 
the early 1930s Acland believed that the key to a Liberal revival was the 
party‟s ability to „wrest control of the countryside from the Conservatives ‟.40 
Indeed, it is no coincidence that the survival of Cornish Liberalism after the 
Second World War was more evident in rural Bodmin and North Cornwall, 
rather than in the industrial areas further west. However, the main purpose of 
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this particular section is to focus on the growing impact of territorial politics in 
Acland‟s Cornwall. It will examine the fusion of Celtic rhetoric and 
anti-metropolitanism in the region‟s political culture, with a view to developing a 
wider picture of the Cornish Celtic Revival. Te implications of this process 
for Cornwall‟s subsequent political alignment are then considered. 
Before returning to  Acland i t  is  necessary to  br iefly review the  
historiography of the Revival. It was noted earlier that the emergence of 
the Celto-Cornish movement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries has been seen as an essentially cultural phenomenon. Bernard 
Deacon in the 1980s remarked that „Te Cornish Revivalists, more than their 
Celtic colleagues, positively wallowed in the un-reason of Romanticism‟.41 
Its central concern was with the restoration of the Cornish language along 
with the creation of new cultural institutions such as Gorseth Kernow (the 
Cornish Gorsedd) in 1928. Payton points out that there „were, predictably, no 
corresponding political or economic aims‟.42 Leading figures like the Rev. W. 
S. Lach Szyrma and Turstan Peter were unable to embrace the cause of 
Cornish Home Rule due to their personal support of the Conservative and 
Liberal Unionist parties. In any case, the Revivalists themselves admitted 
that their activities had „scarcely touched the lives of the common people 
in Cornwall‟.43 Amy Hale, writing in 1997, asserted that in the early 1900s 
„Celtic status was not then a burning issue in Cornwall itself‟. Cowethas 
Kelto-Kernuak‟s campaign to persuade the pan-Celtic Celtic Association to 
recognise the Duchy as a Celtic nation was hardly popular since „the press 
was at best ambivalent ... and the issue drew virtually no response from the 
public‟.44 Te general consensus, then, is that the early Cornish Revivalists 
were an apolitical and marginal force that was unable to engage with wider 
trends in society at the very moment when their counterparts in Scotland and 
Wales were laying the foundations of separate nationalist parties. 
But when it comes to the politics of Cornish identity, there is a need to 
reassess the wider influence of the Revival. A useful starting point is Acland‟s 
own election campaign at Camborne in December 1910, which provides some 
revealing insights into the way in which a popular sense of „Celticity‟ was 
already starting to make an impact on political debate. For example, when 
Acland declared his support for Irish Home Rule at his adoption meeting 
he added that this move could then be followed by devolution for Scotland, 
Wales, England and Cornwall.
45
 Local newspapers referred to the Celtic 
character of the Cornish electorate with the Cornubian comparing Acland 
to other „great Parliamentary speakers [that] have come into Cornwall to 
find that their eloquence is foreign to the locality, for Cornishmen have a 
Celtic love of fervid speech ‟.46 An „outsider‟ whose debating skills did prove 
popular with Cornish voters was George Hay Morgan, Liberal MP for the 
adjacent constituency of Truro from 1906 to 1918. Truro had been a Unionist 
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seat since 1886 but Morgan, a Baptist preacher and a former member of the 
Welsh nationalist movement Cymru Fydd, went out of his way to attract 
the Methodist vote by preaching in the principal chapels in his constituency. 
Even in December 1910 when the Unionist champion was Charles Williams, 
the son of a popular local landlord, the Liberals were able to retain the seat. 
Significantly, Morgan justified his right to represent a Cornish seat on the 
grounds that he was a fellow Celt. In an election speech he expressed his 
admiration for „Mr Williams because he was a Cornishman, a Celt, and he 
(Mr Morgan) was that. They all belonged to the same stock, of the same 
blood and line but the ancestors of one went to Mid Wales and of the other to 
West Wales ... They were all Welshmen‟.47 
Experienced politicians like Morgan were unlikely to make such statements if 
a general sense of Cornwall‟s Celtic identity was not understood in relation to 
the popular culture of the time. A possible catalyst for this emerging 
Celtic discourse during the years leading up to the First World War was 
Cornwall‟s eventual acceptance as a „Celtic nation‟ at the 1904 Celtic 
Congress. Despite the ambivalence of some local newspapers, the fact that 
the campaign was reported at all was significant since it appears to have 
encouraged a greater public use of the word „Celtic‟ in relation to Cornwall‟s 
political and religious culture in subsequent years.
48
 References to Cornwall‟s 
„Celtic passion for liberty‟ or the „Celtic fervour‟ of Cornish Methodism could 
in any case be understood through a popular understanding of the region‟s 
past. It is recognized today that „much earlier in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, the Cornish intelligentsia had already constructed its 
own ethnic history‟ through the writings of individuals like William Borlase 
and Samuel Drew.
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 Moreover, political activists in the Liberal Party, in 
contrast perhaps to the Celtic Revivalists themselves, were able to make 
an instinctive connection between cultural and nationalist politics. A good 
example was Alfred Browning Lyne, editor of the Cornish Guardian and a 
future chairman of Bodmin Liberal Association. In 1912 he expressed his 
support for Cornish Home Rule after making the logical assumption that 
the antiquarian agenda of Cowethas Kelto-Kernuak would inevitably lead to 
calls for regional autonomy: 
There is another Home Rule movement on the horizon. Self-government 
for Cornwall will be the next move. There has been a remarkable revival 
in the pan-Celtic movement, particularly in Brittany. „Bretons will not be 
satisfied‟, we read, „until they have reinstated their native land as a federal 
state under the French fag, but with as much independence as the ... 
German States. They want Home Rule‟. In these seditious ideas, 
Cornishmen appear to be sharing ... It is true that the programme 
sketched out for the [Cornish] Association at present is simply „the 
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study and discussion of Celtic relics, literary, artistic, and legendary‟. 
But who can doubt that it means „separation‟? 50 
Lyne‟s interpretation of the Revival also reflects the importance of 
pan-Celtic issues in pre-war British politics. Te campaign for Irish Home 
Rule was increasingly linked to a wider agenda that included the 
disestablishment of the Anglican Church in nonconformist Wales and the 
creation of a federal system of government for the British Isles. For the 
Cornish Liberals the Duchy‟s official recognition in 1904 as a Celtic nation 
had been timely. Te opposition was campaigning on a pro-English and 
anti-Celtic platform that criticized Asquith‟s government for neglecting the 
national interest in favour, as Acland‟s Unionist opponent in Camborne put it, of 
„Ireland for the Irish, Scotland for the Scottish, Wales for the Welsh and England 
for the foreigner‟.51 By presenting their policies in a pan-Celtic context the 
Liberals attempted to defect these attacks by appealing to Cornish patriotism. A 
space for nationalist politics was created in the process, with a „Cornish 
question‟ now starting to be posed alongside the more established „Irish 
question‟. In terms of practical policies there is evidence that an 
anti-metropolitan agenda was starting to emerge at this time based on policies 
ranging from Acland‟s own concern for the local issue of leasehold 
enfranchisement to calls for greater financial assistance from the state to 
support the Duchy‟s farming and fishing interests.52 
It was the issue of Anglican disestablishment that raised the prospect 
of some form of separate constitutional accommodation for Cornwall. Te 
Cornish Celtic Revival has been portrayed as a „quest to rebuild a pre-
industrial Celtic-Catholic culture in Cornwall‟ that was unable to „address 
[its] aspirations to the Methodist majority‟.53 It was certainly the case that key 
figures in the early days of the Revival like Jenner, Louis Duncombe Jewell 
and Lach Szyrma were either High Anglicans or Roman Catholics. But 
this did not mean that the nonconformists were unreceptive to the cultural 
discourse of the Celtic Revival. Even Jenner remarked in 1904 that „a very 
large proportion‟ of the support for his Cornish language work came from „the 
classes of hard-working clerks, small business men, shopkeepers, and artisans, the 
classes that form the backbone of Cornish Methodism – a very different sort 
of people from the same classes in a non-Celtic country‟.54 Comparisons were 
also made with the nationalist campaign for Anglican disestablishment in 
nonconformist Wales. Advocates on both sides of the debate acknowledged that 
Cornwall‟s Celtic identity could be used to justify its independence from 
the jurisdiction of the established Church of England.
55
 A revealing insight 
can be seen in the comments of Mr T. J. Bennetto, the headmaster of Mevagissey 
Council School, who gave a talk on Cornwall‟s Celtic identity to the 
congregation of Mount Charles United Methodist Chapel in March 1912. 
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Bennetto concluded that Cornwall‟s ability to maintain „its independence 
for so long differentiated [it] from every county in England. With regard 
to the Christian religion it could be said of Cornwall, as Mr Lloyd George 
had said of Wales, that the Established religion was an imposition‟. 56 Once 
again there is a need to look beyond the beliefs and activities of Cowethas 
Kelto-Kernuak in order to understand the full impact of the Revival on 
Liberal-Nonconformist Cornwall. 
However, the failure of the Liberals to support the Cornish 
anti-redistribution campaign during the First World War highlights 
the limitations to that party‟s ability to act as a surrogate nationalist 
movement. In 1917 there was widespread opposition across the political 
spectrum to the recommendations of the boundary commission for a 
reduction in Cornwall‟s parliamentary representation from seven to five 
seats. A petition was organised by local councils, trade unionists and 
political activists in favour of a compromise measure of six seats that would 
allow for the historical link to continue between parliamentary divisions and 
local industries .57 Te latter concern was of particular importance to St 
Austell, with its china clay interests, and Camborne, which was popularly 
known as the „Mining Division‟. Interestingly, it was Acland who emerged as 
the principal opponent of the campaign. Although the Liberals had been the 
„pioneers of the six-seat scheme‟, the member for Camborne undermined the 
chances of an all-party alliance by publicly declaring that the „Liberals were 
honourably bound not to try to disturb the redistribution proposals‟.58 With 
Cornwall‟s other Liberal MPs generally loyal to the new Lloyd George 
Coalition the anti-redistributionists required Acland‟s support to mount an 
effective challenge. In the event Cornwall‟s representation was reduced to 
just five seats as a result of the changes implemented by the 1918 
Representation of the People Act. 
What was significant about the campaign was the way in which it 
appealed to regionalist sentiment. Te official petition document called on 
central government „to grant them a one and undivided Cornwall which 
will satisfy all local interests, aspirations and feelings ‟. 59 This concern for 
the region‟s territorial integrity was to become the cultural pivot, as Deacon 
suggests, for ethnic mobilization in Cornwall in the second half of the 
twentieth century.
60
 Moreover, the anti-redistributionists consciously adopted 
the model advocated in connection to the „Irish Question‟ in order to justify 
separate accommodation for Cornwall. Gladstone in 1885 had defended the 
principle of greater representation for Ireland on the grounds that the more 
remote parts of the United Kingdom required special treatment since they 
were so far from London. The anti-redistributionists now argued that this 
precedent should be applied to Cornwall. Intriguingly, the Cornish Post, which 
supported the campaign, now promoted the views of Reginald F. Reynolds, a 
member of Cowethas Kelto-Kernuak in the early 1900s. Reynolds claimed 
Francis Acland and Cornish Politics, 1910–1922  
that the real problem for the Revivalists was that they had been „struggling 
to find expressions of their views‟ until the emergence of the threat to 
Cornwall‟s parliamentary representation. He added that „Home Rule reigns 
in the heart of the Cornish‟ and saw the anti-redistribution campaign as a 
unique opportunity to „put the Cornish case‟ to Westminster .61 Acland was 
forced on the defensive by newspaper criticism of his stance. He claimed 
that extra seats for Cornwall could not come at the expense of those urban 
areas that had „grown enormously since the last redistribution‟ and denied 
the claim „that this can be dealt with solely as a Cornish question‟ since the 
national interest had to take priority: 
I am quite aware that I might become the most popular man in 
the Duchy by running a campaign that Cornwall is of such special 
importance that there must be no reduction of the present membership. 
But this is not a time for bothering about personal popularity. It‟s a 
time for facing up to facts, and the facts are that we must either 
accept the present proposals or work out a new system more likely to 
be generally approved.62 
These comments under l ine the fac t  tha t  the absence of e ffec t ive  
parliamentary support was a serious problem for the embryonic cause of 
Cornish nationalism. Despite occasional appeals to Celtic and regionalist 
sentiment on the part of the Duchy‟s Liberal MPs, there was no individual 
prepared to take on the mantle of leadership, in contrast to Ireland and Wales. This 
certainly applied to Acland who preferred to focus on the great issues of 
state. A good example of his lack of interest in low politics can be seen in a 
letter written to his wife Eleanor in November 1917 when he revealed his 
true feelings on the subject of redistribution. Writing from the House of Commons 
he remarked that he had to remain in London „in case we reach Cornwall in 
the Schedules to the Reform Bill – not that there‟s anything much I want to 
say but that if every other Cornish member says something I must ‟.63 
Although placing great emphasis in public on his duty and responsibilities in 
representing the interests of his constituency, he preferred to focus his energies 
on securing the core goals of female suffrage and proportional representation 
under the terms of the 1918 Act. 
Acland‟s growing disenchantment with Cornwall was another factor. His 
letters to Eleanor express his frustration with the nonconformist sentiments of 
a community that, as he saw it, seemed to believe in the „sinfulness of 
feeling happy‟.64 Te impact of war appeared to strengthen the fundamentalist 
beliefs of the hard core of Cornish Methodism, resulting in the refusal of 
many nonconformist farmers to work on the Sabbath, public criticism of 
sexual immorality in the armed services, and a popular campaign for the 
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total prohibition of alcohol .65 It was the latter concern that caused particular 
problems for Acland, since his moderate policy of simply controlling the 
liquor trade was not acceptable to his local party activists. He claimed that 
„the good citizens of St Day, Lanner & St Agnes‟ were only interested in the 
„Drink question‟ rather than the wider issues of foreign affairs and post-war 
reconstruction. 
66 
Indeed, he portrayed wartime Cornwall as a parochial and 
insular society, with his constituents opposing the presence of „outsiders‟ and 
critical of his wartime absence from Camborne. Acland‟s frustration with the 
Cornish increasingly took on racial overtones during the war. This included 
patronizing comments about „their present state of development‟ and t he 
claim that „it was quite impossible to judge what they were thinking of, if 
anything‟.67 One might add that Acland was not alone in expressing racist 
remarks about the Cornish. Before the First World War Lyne wrote of his 
annoyance at the tendency for „outsiders‟ to dismiss Cornwall as an uncivilised 
place where „perhaps it is thought the natives eat a missionary now and then ‟.68 In 
the case of Acland, we have an example of an individual who could only 
relate to Cornwall through an appreciation of its landscape rather than any 
sense of affinity with its inhabitants: 
After the Redruth meeting I‟ve had a regular Cornish time. Utterly 
unable to find any sign that the people regard themselves as citizens or 
have any sort of duties in connection with carrying on the war ... We 
had a jolly time this morning at Tehidy and on the north cliffs. There 
was a fair sea on & hundreds of gulls resting on the rocks and flying 
up and filling the air whenever we looked over. They were pairing 
but not nesting yet, and a raven, & flocks of jackdaws flying higher 
than the gulls. And all the gulls screamed. It started a drizzly day 
but gradually cleared and a good cold wind got up and I really like it 
... I slept all the afternoon and that was pleasant but that and the 
cliffs were the only things I‟ve liked .69 
Acland‟s frustration was to lead to his retirement from Camborne in 
1922. Yet his preference for high politics was to be repeated by other Liberal 
candidates. During the 1920s Cornwall‟s reputation as one of the party‟s 
few remaining strongholds meant that it attracted the attention of national 
politicians in search of a safe seat. Te classic example was in 1929 when 
three out of the five Cornish MPs had previously served as government 
ministers under Asquith or Lloyd George .70 Isaac Foot‟s personal popularity in 
Cornwall perhaps reflected the fact that he was a rare example of a Liberal MP 
who was able to build a political career through his personal efforts at the 
community level. Even his son John, who was to contest Bodmin for the 
Liberals after the Second World War, was to declare in 1950 that there 
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„were too many MPs already who were more concerned with the welfare of 
their own constituencies than with the wider and more important  national 
and international issues ‟.71 Paradoxically, such sentiments ran parallel to 
continuing attempts to portray Liberalism as the peninsula‟s natural ideology, 
with claims in the inter -war period that „Cornishmen had always been 
Liberals‟ and only Liberals could „understand Cornish folk ‟.72 Preliminary 
oral history research suggests that it was this regionalist dimension to the 
party‟s identity in Cornwall that passed into cultural memory. A recorded 
group discussion in 2000 found that interviewees tended to make sense of 
their political memories through reference to stories about „local‟ Liberals 
like Robartes and Foot. One individual even summed up political alignment 
before the Second World War by claiming that „If you wasn‟t Methodist and 
Liberal you weren‟t Cornish ‟.73 
These conflicting agendas influenced the subsequent development 
of electoral politics. Te popular perception that the Liberals were Cornwall‟s 
traditional party helped them to compete effectively against Labour and the 
Conservatives. On the other hand the party‟s electoral position might well 
have been weakened in the long term by the perception that its MPs simply 
regarded Cornwall as a way of returning to Westminster. In 1935 a party 
activist in Camborne complained that „We have had L iberal members in 
this division whom we have never seen nor heard of after they have been 
elected ‟.74 Acland was undoubtedly one of those individuals since he had been 
criticised by his own supporters for this very reason. Te problem was that 
inter-war Cornwall was no longer a Liberal stronghold. All of the seats won 
by the party in three-cornered contests in this period were held by relatively 
slender majorities. This meant that it was essential for sitting members to 
address local concerns in order to retain vital votes. It was a point recognized 
by a series of Conservative MPs like Peter Agnew (Camborne, 1931–50) 
and Douglas Marshall (Bodmin, 1951–64) who gradually consolidated their 
party‟s supremacy at the local level during the middle decades. Whilst there is 
an understandable tendency to focus on the myth of Liberal Cornwall, given 
the party‟s survival as an effective force, consideration should also be given 
to the failure to retain its traditional strongholds in contrast, for example, to 
rural Wales. Part of the answer may well have been the general absence in 
Cornwall of Liberal candidates who could identify with their constituencies. 
There were also implications for nationalist politics. Te emergence of a 
„Cornish Question‟ in the pre-war period had suggested that the Duchy was 
moving in the same direction as the other Celtic nations. Yet there were no 
effective agencies to sustain this interest into the 1920s. In the same decade 
that nationalist parties were formed in Scotland and Wales the  Cornish 
Revivalists could only attempt to attract public opinion by creating cultural 
institutions. Te Cornish Liberals, now lacking the external stimulus of 
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pan-Celtic causes like Welsh disestablishment, and with a parliamentary 
leadership looking to Westminster, were unable to fill the void by building 
on pre-war developments and reinventing themselves as a consistent 
anti-metropolitan force. 
Conclusion 
Acland represented Camborne at a critical period in Cornwall‟s political 
history. Te early appeal of Labour, combined with the impact of the Cornish 
Celtic Revival on popular culture, appeared to be leading to a realignment 
of Cornish politics in line with developments elsewhere in Bri tain. By the 
early 1920s, however, there was to be a return to the old order. To some 
extent social and economic conditions in Cornwall were not really conducive to 
political change. Te lack of a trade union tradition, following the decline of 
mining in the previous century, along with the strength of small family 
businesses in sectors like agriculture, certainly presented obstacles to Labour. A 
similar weakness could be seen in regard to the antiquarian nature of the 
Celtic movement in Cornwall. Yet this study suggests that we should 
recognize the part that individuals and events can play at a time of transition. 
Acland‟s failure to lead the anti-redistribution campaign in 1917 came at a 
time when the „Cornish question‟ had been placed firmly on the political 
agenda. It could also be argued that his decision to fight Camborne rather 
than Bodmin in 1918 indirectly led to Foot emerging as the champion of 
traditional radical nonconformity in the early 1920s. By examining the actions and 
beliefs of a forgotten Liberal we can, therefore, gain greater insight into the 
history of twentieth-century Cornish politics as a whole. 
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